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Abstract
The Normativity of Law in Law and Economics P eter Cserne* 1. Introduction
This paper is about some theoretical and methodological problems of law and
economics (economic analysis of law, EAL). More specically, I will use game
theoretical insights to answer the question, relevant both for law and economics
and legal philosophy, how should a social scientic analysis of law account for
the normativity of law (the non-instrumental reasons for rule-following) while
retaining the observer's (explanatory or descriptive) perspective. The goal is to
oer a constructive critique of both traditional law and economics scholarship
and mainstream analytical legal philosophy (the \Jurisprudence of Orthodoxy",
see Leith and Ingham, 1977) in this respect. I will try to nd out what EAL has
to do with the \internal aspect of law", i.e. the fact or the claim that law pro-
vides specic reasons for action, in order to successfully challenge mainstream
legal theory. EAL can be conceived either as a (consequentialist) normative le-
gal philosophy, as an explanatory/descriptive theory about law (rational choice
theory applied to law) or as a set of propositions for legal reform (legal pol-
icy). In this paper I will concentrate on the second, explanatory branch. In
this second sense, EAL seeks to explain, rst, how law inuences human be-
haviour by changing incentives (law as explanans) and, second, to analyse legal
(and possibly non-legal) rules as the outcome of individual actions (law as ex-
planandum). This explanatory/descriptive approach has to confront a clear and
central problem, often raised as a (self)critique of standard EAL: its inability
or inadequacy to deal with the internal perspective on law. In fact, even if
this approach has several more or less sophisticated versions what seems to be
common to all of them is to treat legal rules (rule-following) instrumentally.
Thus the case of rule-guided behaviour is either included in these theories in
an ad hoc manner or is missing altogether. On the other side, contemporary
analytical legal philosophy which is (at least in the English-speaking world) gen-
erally considered as a branch of practical philosophy, usually treats legal rules
as specic non-instrumental reasons for action. In this view, even if empirically
there are dierent motives why people obey the law (including conformism, fear
of sanctions, etc.), the nature of law is dened by this specic reason, while
the further motives are not reasons in a genuine sense for compliance with the
law. Now, in order to be taken seriously as an explanatory legal theory, EAL
has to account for this feature i.e. that law oers reasons for action, and to
answer (or at least take side in the current philosophical debate on) some fun-
damental questions about the normativity of law. These questions are both
conceptual/analytical (`What is the conceptual dierence between regularity of
behaviour and rule-following?', `What does it mean to follow a rule?') and ex-
planatory (`Why people obey the law if they do?'). At the same time, in order
to be taken seriously as sound social science, EAL has to stick to the method-
ological principles of rational choice theory as explanatory social science. In thefollowing I shall enquire whether EAL can full this double challenge. One con-
sequence of these methodological principles should be emphasised right at the
beginning. The normative or justicatory question, central to mainstream ana-
lytical legal philosophy conceived as a part of normative practical philosophy, `Is
there a (moral) duty to obey the law?' should remain outside the scope of this
paper (and in general, explanatory/descriptive EAL). But the moral or pruden-
tial standpoint of the participants who face this question in some form should,
of course, be recorded and included in the analysis as an object of explanation.
To repeat, I shall be speaking about EAL throughout only in the second sense
as an explanatory enterprise. As a dierent enterprise, it might be possible to
work out a full-edged normative legal philosophy as a version of EAL, based
roughly on welfarist (consequentialist) principles, which would have to answer
that justicatory question. But this prospect doesn't concern me here.1 In the
last decades serious eorts have been made within rational choice theory (espe-
cially game theory) to deal with norms both as explananda and as explanantia.
In these analyses norms are often denoted more specically as `social norms'
and considered explicitly as non-legal, i.e. in contradistinction to legal norms.
As it will be clear, these models are still highly relevant for my purposes. In
part, but not only because the mechanisms exposed in these rational choice
models are general enough to be applicable to legal rules too. My question
is now, whether the incorporation of these results of rational choice theory in
EAL makes it possible to approach the abovementioned basic problems of legal
theory in a new way. In a broader perspective it might be possible that also
the gap between explanatory social science and normative practical philosophy
can be bridged via evolutionary game theory, especially the indirect evolution-
ary approach. The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 presents
how rule-following is modelled in standard EAL scholarship. Section 3 is about
the jurisprudential meaning, importance and explanations of the normativity of
law. Instead of the detailed analysis of jurisprudential and legal philosophical
issues related to the normativity of law I will restrict myself to sketch the most
characteristic standpoints. Section 4 overviews rational choice models of norms
and normativity and discusses some features of the legal system in view of the
previous insights. This section is intended to be systematic (maybe at some
price of details and originality) but is evidently far from exhaustive. Section 5
concludes.1




This paper is about some theoretical and methodological problems of law and
economics (economic analysis of law, EAL). More specifically, I will use game
theoretical insights to answer the question, relevant both for law and economics and
legal philosophy, how should a social scientific analysis of law account for the
normativity of law (the non-instrumental reasons for rule-following) while retaining the
observer’s (explanatory or descriptive) perspective. The goal is to offer a constructive
critique of both traditional law and economics scholarship and mainstream analytical
legal philosophy (the “Jurisprudence of Orthodoxy”, see Leith and Ingham, 1977) in
this respect. I will try to find out what EAL has to do with the “internal aspect of law”,
i.e. the fact or the claim that law provides specific reasons for action, in order to
successfully challenge mainstream legal theory.
EAL can be conceived either as a (consequentialist) normative legal philosophy, as
an explanatory/descriptive theory about law (rational choice theory applied to law) or as
a set of propositions for legal reform (legal policy). In this paper I will concentrate on
the second, explanatory branch. In this second sense, EAL seeks to explain, first, how
law influences human behaviour by changing incentives (law as explanans) and,
second, to analyse legal (and possibly non-legal) rules as the outcome of individual
actions (law as explanandum).
This explanatory/descriptive approach has to confront a clear and central problem,
often raised as a (self)critique of standard EAL: its inability or inadequacy to deal with
the internal perspective on law. In fact, even if this approach has several more or less
sophisticated versions what seems to be common to all of them is to treat legal rules
(rule-following)  instrumentally.  Thus the case of rule-guided behaviour is either
included in these theories in an ad hoc manner or is missing altogether.
On the other side, contemporary analytical legal philosophy which is (at least in the
English-speaking world) generally considered as a branch of practical philosophy,
usually treats legal rules as specific non-instrumental reasons for action. In this view,
even if empirically there are different motives why people obey the law (including
conformism, fear of sanctions, etc.), the nature of law is defined by this specific reason,
while the further motives are not reasons in a genuine sense for compliance with the
law.
Now, in order to be taken seriously as an explanatory legal theory, EAL has to
account for this feature i.e. that law offers reasons for action, and to answer (or at least
take side in the current philosophical debate on) some fundamental questions about the
normativity of law. These questions are both conceptual/analytical (‘What is the
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conceptual difference between regularity of behaviour and rule-following?’, ‘What does
it mean to follow a rule?’) and explanatory (‘Why people obey the law if they do?’). At
the same time, in order to be taken seriously as sound social science, EAL has to stick to
the methodological principles of rational choice theory as explanatory social science. In
the following I shall enquire whether EAL can fulfil this double challenge.
One consequence of these methodological principles should be emphasised right at
the beginning. The normative or justificatory question, central to mainstream analytical
legal philosophy conceived as a part of normative practical philosophy, ‘Is there a
(moral) duty to obey the law?’ should remain outside the scope of this paper (and in
general, explanatory/descriptive EAL). But the moral or prudential standpoint of the
participants who face this question in some form should, of course, be recorded and
included in the analysis as an object of explanation. To repeat, I shall be speaking about
EAL throughout only in the second sense as an explanatory enterprise. As a different
enterprise, it might be possible to work out a full-fledged normative legal philosophy as
a version of EAL, based roughly on welfarist (consequentialist) principles, which would
have to answer that justificatory question. But this prospect doesn’t concern me here.
1
In the last decades serious efforts have been made within rational choice theory
(especially game theory) to deal with norms both as explananda and as explanantia. In
these analyses norms are often denoted more specifically as ‘social norms’ and
considered explicitly as non-legal, i.e. in contradistinction to legal norms. As it will be
clear, these models are still highly relevant for my purposes. In part, but not only
because the mechanisms exposed in these rational choice models are general enough to
be applicable to legal rules too. My question is now, whether the incorporation of these
results of rational choice theory in EAL makes it possible to approach the above-
mentioned basic problems of legal theory in a new way.
In a broader perspective it might be possible that also the gap between explanatory
social science and normative practical philosophy can be bridged via evolutionary game
theory, especially the indirect evolutionary approach.
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 presents how rule-following is
modelled in standard EAL scholarship. Section 3 is about the jurisprudential meaning,
importance and explanations of the normativity of law. Instead of the detailed analysis
of jurisprudential and legal philosophical issues related to the normativity of law I will
restrict myself to sketch the most characteristic standpoints. Section 4 overviews
rational choice models of norms and normativity and discusses some features of the
legal system in view of the previous insights. This section is intended to be systematic
(maybe at some price of details and originality) but is evidently far from exhaustive.
Section 5 concludes.
2. What is wrong with EAL and how to “save” it?
Despite the complaints that “much of law and economics scholarship is strikingly un-
self-critical” (Hanson and Hart, 1996: 328), it would be very easy to enumerate
hundreds of articles by law and economics scholars offering thoroughgoing and
fundamental critiques of their own discipline. There are different types, levels and styles
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of the objections.
2 In the following I shall try to avoid naiveté and moralising and be
constructive in drawing attention to possible solutions to the problems detected.
2.1 EAL as rational-choice sociology of law
As mentioned in the Introduction, the economic analysis of law can be conceived either
as a (consequentialist) normative/evaluative legal philosophy (EAL1), as an
explanatory/descriptive theory (sociology) of law (rational choice theory applied to law;
EAL2) or as a set of propositions for legal reform (legal policy, Rechtspolitik, EAL3).
What I mean by EAL1 as legal philosophy is a partly conceptual and partly normative
analysis dealing, in part, with the question how to justify efficiency as the main guiding
principle of law. By EAL3 as legal policy is meant a more or less coherent system of
proposals for reforming legal rules in order to fulfil certain hypotethically or tacitly
accepted normative criteria of which efficiency is the most important.
3
For several reasons, it seems the most fruitful to concentrate in the following on the
second, explanatory branch. Speaking about rational choice theory and more generally
the methodology of the social sciences in EAL2, I refer to the approach elaborated most
convincingly by Jon Elster. Especially I mean the methodological stance that he shares
in common with such fellow sociologists as Raymond Boudon, James S. Coleman,
Hartmut Esser, Siegwart Lindenberg, Karl-Dieter Opp and others. Their most important
common premises are methodological individualism, non-teleological view of society,
and the heuristic primacy of rationality. Following Coleman, the theory is based on
three explanatory links: macro-micro, micro-micro, micro-macro (the “bathtub” form)
as it seeks to explain social phenomena on the macro level by using individualistic
mechanisms. EAL2 is a part of this “grand theory”.
2.2 Traditional EAL on rule-following
Standard economic models usually follow O. W. Holmes (1897) in adopting a bad
man’s view on law.
4 That is, they treat legal rules not as obligations but as incentives or
prices. This view is clearly reflected in the EAL arguments for “the efficient breach of
contract” (see Cserne, 2003) and is present in other legal areas as well. In this view,
people (should) obey the law as long as they are deterred by sanctions:
“Managers do not have an ethical duty to obey economic regulatory law just because
law exists. They must determine the importance of these laws. The penalties Congress
names for disobedience are a measure of how much it wants firms to sacrifice in order
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3 I have elaborated on this classification elsewhere (Cserne, 2004: 300–302), discussing why the usual
dichotomy of normative and positive analysis is incomplete and imprecise in several respects. For
different classifications (also diverting from the usual normative/positive dichotomy) see Kornhauser,
2001 and Ogus, 2004.
4 “If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only for the
material consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his
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to adhere to the rules; the idea of optimal sanctions is based on the supposition that
managers not only may but also should violate the rules when it is profitable to do so.“
5
Even if the normative  version of this view is less popular now, standard EAL
considers sanctions as prices, it imputes to citizens only prudential reasons for
compliance with the law, briefly it adopts an external perspective on law. This bad
man’s view is in general not a descriptively correct model of human behaviour in face
of law and its predictions are often contradicted by empirical findings, both in surveys
and in experiments. But as we shall see, there are numerous contexts where it is not far
from being realistic and in a certain respect it is close to recent jurisprudential views.
A further characteristic of standard EAL could be called legal centralism (Posner,
2000: ch. 1, Ellickson, 1998: 541). This is the view that law is the only relevant
normative rule to be modelled in EAL. Non-legal mechanisms of co-operation are often
neglected. Enacted law is supposed to modify the behaviour of the agents as changes in
market prices do, while law is enforced in an anonymous way. “By exaggerating the
reach of law, [EAL scholars have] underrated two other major sources of order:
internally enforced norms (socialisation) and externally enforced norms. In addition,
they paid too little heed to the human pursuit of status.” (Ellickson, 1998: 539)
Here, again, it should be noted that in a number of contexts the anonymity of agents
and the lack of reputation effects is a realistic assumption, but in others (e.g. in village
societies) it is clearly unconvincing (cf. Andreozzi, 2002: 407–8, Platteau, 2000: 246).
We come back to the question of the interaction of legal and non-legal norms in section
4.2.1.
Another general but rather implicit assumption of the standard version of EAL is,
interestingly, that “public officials in general and judges in particular, are conscientious.
Judges thus enforce the legal rules as they are announced, regardless of the judge’s own
view of the desirability of the legal rule or its impact on her personally.” (Kornhauser,
2001: sec. 1.) True, there are models on “what do judges maximise?” and Posner in his
jurisprudential works outlined his own theory of adjudication too (Posner, 1990).
6 Still,
when EAL scholars (or economists, more generally) work on policy analysis (e. g. the
comparison of negligence and strict liability regimes in tort law) they usually have in
mind a benevolent lawgiver who is waiting for their advice and willing and able to
enforce the policy recommendations through the judiciary or a loyal bureaucracy (for a
sharp critique of this view see Sugden, 1986: 6–8). To note, this perspective is
completely different both from the public choice and the constitutional economics view
on law and state (politics).
                                                
5 Cited from Easterbrook and Fischel in Cooter, 1984: 1523 n. 2.
6 In one sense, Richard Posner writes from the participant perspective, i.e. as an American federal
appellate judge (in Posner, 1990). In another sense, he wants to account for this judge-perspective from
outside, i. e. to explain from a given preference profile and institutional constraints what and how judges
maximise when they behave as judges. The two perspectives don’t seem fully compatible. He attempts to
solve this by positing that his theory of adjudication is a different enterprise than EAL. And according to
this theory the judge has to use other principles (most notably corrective justice) along with wealth
maximisation in deciding “hard cases” (see Cserne, 2004).
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2.3 Ad hoc and quasi-instrumental explanations of normativity of law
As seen, standard EAL models treat legal rules (rule-following) instrumentally. In more
complicated models,
7 this basic view is
(1) either sustained in a subtle way, as e. g. by Eric Posner who explains co-operative
behaviour in a repeated-game framework as a signalling mechanism (roughly,
people comply with rules in order to sustain their reputation for trustworthiness,
Posner, 2000), or
(2) alternatively, the model is modified to include the case of rule-guided behaviour in
an ad hoc manner, e. g. through a redefinition of preferences, i.e. attaching utility to
norm-conformity itself (Rabin 1993, for a critique see Ambrus-Lakatos 2002), or
(3) by simply assuming a certain proportion of agents to follow norms in a committed
way, interacting with uncommitted others (e.g. Cooter, 1997, 1998, 2000b).
These models are very different in details (actually, this is one problematic aspect of
making  ad hoc assumptions) but similar in spirit. The sympathetic interpretation of
these solutions is that they explain law-abiding behaviour as enforced by non-legal
mechanisms (social norms) which in turn are sustained by those who care about their
future benefits and thus their reputation (have a relatively low discount rate). All this is
in accord with standard assumptions of rational choice theory. The less sympathetic
interpretation (especially of type (1) models) is that “it is more important to appear good
than to be good”, i.e. morality is a mirage or at least a discourse that is reducible to
something more fundamental and essentially non-moral. But why should this be a
problem?
One reason is that, as some argue, there is a categorical difference between moral
and non-moral preferences or moral and prudential reasons for action. An important
aspect of the distinction between norm-following and outcome-oriented action (to go on
with these more or less synonymous dichotomies) has been highlighted by Jon Elster
when discussing John Dunn’s argument about “the relation between virtue and self-
interest” (Elster, 1981: 8):
“the prospect of gains might be a sufficient motive for someone setting out to become
virtuous (though it might also prove an obstacle to that goal), but it cannot be a motive
for being virtuous (though it can, of course, be a motive for appearing to be so).”
Some EAL scholars see this difference, take it seriously but cannot explain it. For
example, even 20 years after his seminal article which made clear the basic difference
between “Prices and Sanctions” in influencing human behaviour (Cooter, 1984), and
after several further illuminating articles modelling non-instrumental norm-following
Robert Cooter includes the possibility of non-instrumental law-abiding in their textbook
chapter on the economic analysis of criminal law (by calling it “civility”) without being
able or willing to handle it analytically more thoroughly. He simply states: “The
economic models of crime that we have been discussing assume that actors decide
whether to obey the law based on a calculus of self-interest. In fact, many people obey
the law from intrinsic motivation and respect.” (Cooter and Ulen, 2004: 466) What is
thus not clear (cf. Cooter, 2000a: 376–379 for “self-criticism”), whether and how this
“intrinsic motivation and respect” can be explained in a rational choice model. We come
back to the possible solutions to this problem in section 4.1.
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2.4 The Meaning of Money
Recent progress in EAL is related to the similarities and differences of prices and
sanctions in another way too. More precisely, here the implied idea is questioned that
both a fine (for violation of the law, an illegal behaviour) and a tax (on the same action,
now considered as legal behaviour) have the same effect on the frequency of a given
action that is punished or taxed.
At first glance, the legal(istic) and jurisprudential distinction of punishment and
taxation seems to be straightforward (Hart, 1994: 39)
8 but it is far from evident that this
has a real impact on the behaviour of the citizens. For example, the payment due for
parking in a forbidden zone (or time) may be considered and can be legally designed
either as a fine or a price. We can imagine that below or above a certain amount, the
“name” of a legal category makes only a semantic difference and does not matter for the
behaviour of citizens looking for a parking lot. Or, even if there is an attitudinal
difference on the micro level, it may be unobservable, at least in a partial equilibrium
model, on the macro level (in the pattern of parking in a given territory). From the
calculative point of view of the norm-subject, both payments count as a price increase
for the action (the deterrent effect can be measured by the expected value of the
payment if we assume risk neutrality). In the traditional EAL logic, it is not clear how
could there be any observable difference in behavioural responses, at least on the macro
level. Still if there is a difference, how can this be translated to different attitudes of
norm-subjects?
Recent empirical research confirms that the simple fact of declaring a behaviour
illegal has some deterrent effect. Labelling matters, especially in criminal law (Kahan
1998). Formally, this is a special case of the framing effect in terms of behavioural
economics (from the orthodox rational choice perspective it is generally considered as
an “anomaly”, a deviation from the standard homo oeconomicus model). Substantially,
it is an example of the general sociological insight that money may have different
meaning according to the social context in which it is extracted or paid (Zelizer 1994,
1998).
If these results about the importance of labelling and social meaning of law turn out
to be robust and thus get included in EAL, it also means that at least one usual
assumption behind non-market economics (“the imperialism of economics”, see Becker
1976, Radnitzky – Bernholz 1987, Ramb – Tietzel 1993, Cserne 2000) has to be
reconsidered. Namely that one, according to which human behaviour can be modelled in
every  social context (e.g. on the market and in the family) essentially in the same
(maximising, self-interested) way.
9 It may turn out as well that what counts as
‘economic’ cannot be defined in a completely formal way (following L. Robbins) but
has some substantive meaning too (in accord with K. Polányi’s view).
                                                
8 Actually, even the legalistic categorisation is unclear. For examples of fuzzy borderlines between taxes,
charges, prices and fines in Hungarian law and an attempt to clarify their differences based on both legal
and economic arguments, see Cserne, 2001.
9 As George Stigler put it: “I arrive by a devious route you observe at the thesis that flows naturally and
even irresistibly from the theory of  economics. Man is eternally a utility-maximizer, in his home, in his
office — be it public or private — in his church, in his scientific work, in short, everywhere." (Stigler,
1982: 35)
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To sum up, in standard EAL models, citizens comply with legal rules for prudential
(instrumental, consequentialist) reasons. At the same time, it is often implicitly assumed
that legal officials act conscientiously in their roles, out of respect for law or following
other non-self-regarding principles. In the next section we shall see how this view can
be judged in light of jurisprudential theories on the normativity of law.
3. The normativity of law in legal philosophy and jurisprudence
At least in the English-speaking world
10 (analytical) legal philosophy has been
considered in the last decades as a branch of practical philosophy,
 along with ethics and
political philosophy. What these branches have in common is the interest in conceptual
and normative questions about the right conduct, about rights, obligations, and duties of
the individual in isolation or in different communities, to put it simple, in the question:
‘What should be done?’ ‘What is good to be done?’ (Wallace 2003). The normativity of
law counts as a basic problem within this paradigm of legal philosophy.
11 Despite the
inner controversies, a great number of legal theorists share a common terminology, and
work on similar problems.
3.1 Basic concepts and the compatibility of jurisprudence and rational choice
theory
Without going into details, it seems necessary to overview briefly the basic concepts of
this practical philosophical paradigm. As will be clear, some of these terms have already
been used above. Consequently, until now it may have seemed evident that
jurisprudence and rational choice theory (including EAL2) are not incompatible. What
is more, in this paper I have implicitly made the assumption that these theories can
mutually benefit from each other. There are, however at least two possible objections
against this project. The first is concerned with the different possible perspectives of
legal theories (see section 3.1.3). The second with the different interpretations of
(practical) ‘reason’ (see section 3.1.4).
                                                
10 It is interesting to note that the differences in legal and philosophical background, research focus, and
argumentative style between English-speaking and Continental legal theory is still considerable. This can
be observed in an exemplary way in an article of the German sociologist Michael Baurmann (2000). In
this paper he tries to work out an empirical (behavioural) reduction of normativity by using a basically
Kelsenian (or Austinian) view of legal theory (without the sophistication thereof) as a departure point. By
concentrating on the norm as an expression of the want of a person in power he seems to be among others
completely unaware of the current Anglo-Saxon paradigm, i. e. Herbert Hart’s fundamental critique of an
imperative theory of law (Hart, 1994: ch. 3–4) and the embeddedness of legal theory in practical
philosophy. These would put Baurmann’s whole enterprise in another light, not to say make it
superfluous. I think, this example not only illustrates dramatically that the “cultural clash” within the legal
academia easily goes over into more “international” disciplines like sociology. But the case is most
remarkable because it concerns a sociologist who otherwise has been applying rational choice theory
brilliantly in his previous work on norms (Baurmann 1996).
11 See, e. g. Karlsson 2001, Postema 1987, Redondo 2000; from an EAL perspective Kornhauser 1999.
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3.1.1. Norm, rule, and law
‘Statistical’ and ‘sociological’ definitions of norm which concentrate on the regularity
of behaviour within a given group of individuals (e.g. Hechter and Opp, 2001) lack the
element of normativity (obligatoriness, ought-element) from the definition of norms.
Analytical legal theory clearly adopts the ‘philosophical’ sense, which treats norms as
prescriptions. For the present purposes, we treat both rules and laws as norms.
3.1.2. Internal and external aspect of rules
According to a now classical distinction of Herbert Hart, one of the defining features of
rules (in contrast to habits or mere regularities of behaviour) is that they can be viewed
both from an internal and an external aspect (Hart, 1994: 55–56). The internal aspect
implies the use of a normative language, a “reflective critical attitude”, i. e. that the rule
is used as a standard to evaluate and criticise the behaviour of all persons to whom it
applies. As for the external perspective, it is concerned with the rules “merely as an
observer who does not himself accept them.” This external point of view can mean two
different things. First, “the observer may, without accepting the rules himself, assert that
the group accepts the rules, and thus may from outside refer to the way in which they
are concerned with them from the internal point of view.” Alternatively, it can refer to
“the position of an observer who does not even refer in this way to the internal point of
view of the group”, “is content merely to record the regularities of observable
behaviour” (Hart, 1994: 89).
Further analyses have shown that this categorisation is not complete. There are
several other possible perspectives on normative phenomena (rules, law). One of them,
further acknowledged also by Hart as important, is called the detached legal point of
view (Joseph Raz) or the hermeneutic view (Neil MacCormick) and refers to the
perspective of somebody who uses the normative language (rights, duties, obligations,
etc.) without being (morally) committed to the normative phenomenon. This view can
be represented by the characteristic semantic form: “According to the law, A has to do
X.”
3.1.3. Observer and participant perspective
This distinction, although strongly related to the former one between internal and
external views, is used here to refer to alternative meta-theoretic standpoints in
jurisprudence about the status of legal theory. The debate is whether legal theory should
be completely outside or partly within the law it seeks to understand. Observers usually
construct “non-legal”, “scientific” theories on or about law while participants, following
Aristotle construct “lawyer’s theories” in law, from within law as a human practice
(form of life).
One of the objections against the use of rational choice theory in jurisprudence is
related to this duality of perspectives. As indicated in the Introduction, I assume in this
paper that it is possible to build up a “descriptive and general legal theory“ in the
8 German Working Papers in Law and Economics Vol. 2004,  Paper 35
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Hartian sense (Hart, 1994: 240–241). Of course this assumption does not rule out that
the “best possible version” of this sort of theory may largely diverge from either Hart’s
or any other current theory in their details. And indeed, the objection is not against
rational choice theory in specific but quite generally against descriptive (sociological)
approaches or the possibility of an observer perspective.
What is not evident (or questionable) for critics (e. g. theorists like Ronald
Dworkin, see Dworkin 1987) is that it is possible to build up a legal theory without
adopting the participant perspective, to follow a methodology which is not interpretive
in the Dworkinian sense. But even at first glance (and I shall not go into details here)
this objection is not well founded, for the following reason. The view on the exclusive
legitimacy of the participant perspective not only questions the possibility of historical
and comparative research (how to find the adequate participant perspective for these?)
but at the bottom line it would imply that social science qua science is not able to
analyse normative phenomena. And this seems to me a rather absurd conjecture.
To answer the possibility of an observer perspective to the assertive doesn’t mean,
however that it is the only or even the theoretically more fruitful, more interesting etc.
perspective. We don’t have to decide this latter question here. Our own methodological
standpoint doesn’t question the legitimacy of others, if they are coherent. E.g. this is the
case with John Finnis who acknowledges that the sociological, descriptive accounts are
valuable even for a theory of natural law, if only with subordinated importance (Finnis,
2002: 12–13).
To note, the duality of perspectives does not coincide with, actually cuts through
the traditional dichotomy between positivist (conventionalist) and naturalist legal
theories (Postema 1987). It is possible that these theories have to compete within both
perspectives. What cannot be accepted, however, is the objection that the non-evaluative
point of view is a logically or practically inadequate, unsound or illegitimate theoretical
perspective.
3.1.4. Instrumental vs. non-instrumental (prudential vs. moral) reasons for rule-
following
Clearly, motivations for obeying the law may be very different and the relative
importance of the types of motivation is an empirical question. Still, as noted in section
2.3. some theorists consider the distinction between instrumental and non-instrumental
reasons categorical, even if both can be modelled within rational choice theory.
12
A related problem concerns again the compatibility of jurisprudence and rational
choice theory. Ultimately related to the first objection, it is about the different meanings
of the terms ‚reason’ and ‚rationality’ in practical philosophy. The problem involved
here can be summarised like this. An influential current type of natural law theories
(e.g. Finnis 1980, 1992, 2002, George 1999) and several other scholars within the
analytical jurisprudential paradigm follow such an interpretation of practical reason that
is explicitly opposed to the concept of rationality used in EAL and rational choice
theory in general (see Wallace 2003).
                                                
12 For example, Jon Elster models non-moral reasons as a second filter of possible actions or as
lexicographic preferences, see section 4.2.2.
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As they argue, rational choice theory speaks both about rationality and choice only
in a technical sense, concentrating on situations where both true reasons and genuine
choices are absent (Finnis 1992: 140–1, 146–7, 150–1). Acting on reasons in the full
and true sense is, in their view, acting undeflected by emotions and feelings (desires),
thus potentially against them. EAL and rational choice theory, on the other side seems
to agree with Hume that “reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions” (see
George 1999: 287–299, esp. 288–290).
This is not the place to evaluate the philosophical merits of the problem involved
but let me make only two remarks. I think that there are several possible ways to
reconcile (deconstruct) the difference between the two approaches. One is to turn to the
distinction, first used by another 18
th century moral philosopher Francis Hutcheson,
between ‘exciting’ (motivating) and ‘justifying’ reasons (see MacCormick 1987: 111–
112, Holton 1998). Furthermore, the ‘rich’ concept of reason that these critics adopt,
even if philosophically fruitful is in my view less fruitful in empirical social science
(which EAL2 based on rational choice theory finally purports to be). Here, the
operationalisation of concepts is needed which is much more problematic in case of the
non-instrumental concept of rationality. As we will see in section 4.2, these two
arguments are related to each other as well as to the problem of normativity of law, to
which we now turn.
3.2 The normativity of law
Normativity as the specificity of rules cannot be understood from the bad man’s view.
“Where rules exist, deviations from them are not merely grounds for a prediction that
hostile reactions will follow or that a court will apply sanctions to those who break
them, but are also a reason or justification for such reaction and for applying the
sanctions.” (Hart, 1994: 84)
Current analytical legal philosophy treats legal rules as specific non-instrumental
reasons for action (see, e. g. Finnis 1992, Raz 1990, Schauer 1991). In this view, even if
empirically there are different motives why people obey the law, the nature of law,
including its normativity is defined by some specific reason while the possible further
motives for conformity are not reasons for compliance with the law in a genuine sense.
True, opinions on the exact nature of the normativity of law diverge within legal
philosophy. In what follows, I shall only give a brief overview of the most influential
views.
13
A complete philosophical account of the normativity of law comprises both an
explanatory and a normative-justificatory task. The explanatory task consists of an
attempt to explain how legal norms can give rise to reasons for action, and what kinds
of reasons are involved. The task of justification concerns the elucidation of the reasons
people ought to have for acknowledging law’s normative aspect. In other words, it is the
attempt to explain the moral legitimacy of law. As noted in the Introduction, I shall
concentrate on the first of these two questions, i. e. the different theories about the
nature of law that purport to explain what the normativity of law actually consists in.
Early representatives of the legal positivist tradition, such as Bentham and Austin,
assumed that the normativity of law resides in its coercive aspect, i. e. that law enforces
its practical demands on its subjects by means of threats and violence. Concerning the
                                                
13 In this overview I closely follow Marmor 2001.
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relative importance of sanctions for the ability of law to fulfil its social functions,
Kelsen maintained that the monopolisation of violence in society, and the law’s ability
to impose its demands by violent means, is the most important of law’s functions in
society. Legal positivists in the 20
th century, like Hart and Raz, claim that coercion is
neither essential to law, nor, actually, pivotal to the fulfilment of its functions in society.
As noted above, Hart emphasised the reason-giving function of rules. Hart’s
fundamental objection to the predictive model is actually a result of his vision about the
main functions of law in society, holding, contra Austin and Kelsen, that those functions
are not exclusively related to the ability of the law to impose sanctions. To answer the
question of why people should regard the rules of law as reasons or justifications for
actions, we have to look at the functions law should or actually does serve. We come
back to this in section 4.2.
One of the most influential approaches to the normativity of law is Joseph Raz’s
theory of authority, which relies in several respects on Hart’s theory (Raz 1990). The
basic insight of Raz’s argument is that the law is an authoritative social institution. The
law is not only a de facto authority but claims also legitimate authority. Even if any
particular legal system may fail to fulfill this claim, law is the kind of institution that
necessarily claims to be a legitimate authority. The essential role of authorities in our
practical reasoning is to mediate between the putative subjects of the authority and the
right reasons that apply to them in the relevant circumstances. An authority is legitimate
only if its putative subjects are likely to comply better with the relevant reasons that
apply to them by following the authoritative resolution than by trying to figure out or
act on those reasons by themselves.
What kinds of things can claim legitimate authority? Authorities are there to make a
practical difference, and they can make such a difference only if the authority’s
directive can be recognised as such without recourse to the reasons it is there to decide
upon. Secondly, for something to be able to claim legitimate authority, it must be
capable of forming an opinion on how its subjects ought to behave, distinct from the
subjects’ own reasoning about their reasons for action. In other words, a practical
authority, like law, must be basically personal authority, in the sense that there cannot
be an authority without an author. Raz’s conception of legal authority requires that the
law, qua an authoritative resolution, be identifiable on its own terms, that is, without
having to rely on those same considerations which the law is there to settle. Therefore a
norm is legally valid (i.e. authoritative) only if its validity does not derive from moral or
other evaluative considerations about which it is there to settle.
4. Rational choice theory on (social) norms
In the last decades serious efforts have been made within rational choice theory
(especially game theory) to deal with norms (both as explananda and as explanantia).
Rational choice models of norms are manifold: some analyse the effect of norms on
behaviour, others the interaction between law and non-legal norms. Both treat norms as
given. Still others try to explain their emergence. This branch is also diverse. Either a
rational reconstruction is given or the process itself is modelled, usually in evolutionary
terms. (See, inter alia Barry 1982, Ben-Ner and Putterman 1998, Bicchieri 1990, 1993,
1997, 2000, 2002, Coleman 1990, Ellickson 2001a, 2001b, Elster 1989b, Hechter and
Opp 2001, Lewis 1969, Metze, Opp and Mühler 2000, Ockruch 1999, Opp, Hechter and
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Wippler 1990, Schotter 1981, Skyrms 1996, Sugden 1986, Ullmann-Margalit 1977,
Wesche 2001, Young 1998)
4.1 Rationality, morality, internalisation
As I stressed before, motivations for obeying the law may be very different and the
relative importance of the types of motivation is an empirical question. But at least since
Max Weber it has been widely accepted in social sciences that the diversity of the
empirical motives should not disallow constructing ideal types or models. Further,
Frederick Schauer argues (1991) by contrasting prudential and moral considerations for
rule-following that the first type of reasons is more important for institutional design.
Among these he distinguishes three different sorts of prudential reason: avoidance of
sanctions, seek for rewards; simplification of decision; epistemic reason: belief that the
rule-giver has superior information on what the agent should do. To be sure, for
explanatory purposes we have to take also the moral reasons into account.
There are several ways to enrich the simple rational choice models in order to
account for morality, internalised norms etc. In this literature, norms are often denoted
as social norms and considered as explicitly non-legal ones. Sometimes, however, the
mechanisms exposed in these rational choice models are general enough to be
applicable to legal rules too. Here are some characteristic attempts in this direction.
4.1.1 Leaving internalisation exogenous
As already mentioned in section 2.3, one of the pioneers of this sort of modelling has
been Robert Cooter (see, e.g. Cooter 1997, 1998, 2000b). His basic idea is to take the
different (moral and amoral) attitudes as given and analyse the dynamics of their
relative success in different environments. Some scholars argue that internalisation
would mean unfalsifiability in explanation because any type of behavior can be
explained as the result of following a putatively internalised but unobservable norm
prescribing the observed behaviour (Opp, Hechter and Wippler 1990: 1-2). They
therefore stick to explanations based on the interest of individuals, i.e. rationality.
Question is, whether this means necessarily instrumentality and self-interest too. There
are different ways open.
4.1.2 Value rationality and lexicographic preferences
It is often argued that the assumptions of rational choice theory concerning the
individuals’ system of preferences cannot be sustained. The formal structure of the
problem is roughly the following (see Csontos, 1999: 213–4). According to an
important but often hidden assumption of economic theory the preferences of
individuals satisfy the so-called Axiom of Archimedes. The definition of the
Archimedean axiom roughly says that in a choice between bundles with different
amounts of goods x and y it is always possible to increase the amount of y by such
measure that directs preference toward a bundle with a smaller amount of x. Such
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calculation is really “one-dimensional” (Csontos, 1999: 213), where “everything has its
price“ (Elster, 1984: 126).
There are, however, preference relations in which it is not so. One of the cases
where an individual’s preferences violate the Archimedean axiom is the so-called
lexicographic ordering. In case of a lexicographic ordering the preference for a bundle
with a smaller amount of x cannot be achieved merely through increasing the amount of
y. That is, “there is no currency (money, power, influence) that could be used to
compensate the actor for the decrease in the amount or the value of the other good”
(Csontos, 1999: 213 n. 5). Lexicographic preferences are an analytical device to model
value rationality (Wertrationalität). Human action based on value rationality means
action based on lexicographic preferences.
This type of preferences raises both formal and substantial issues. Formally they are
not representable in the usual way. But “this does not show that lexicographically
governed behaviour cannot be made amenable to rational choice analysis, only that this
analysis cannot use the handy tool of the utility function.” (Elster, 1984: 125)
Substantially, from a rational choice perspective, lexicographically prior values can be
interpreted as constraints on decision-making rather than criteria for decision making
(ibid.) To be sure, this is the exact opposite of the view of rationality we have seen
above by Finnis and R. P. George. Indeed, the relation of instrumental rationality and
value rationality is a highly interesting and yet unresolved issue of social sciences (see,
e.g. Greve 2003). In Elster’s view, when the Archimedean axiom is not satisfied, we are
dealing with goods or activities that do not lend themselves to the economic approach
but they can represent rational non-economic behaviour (Elster, 1984: 127). It should be
noted that this approach models rationality in a parametric (non-strategic) way. The
further approaches are based on strategic interactions.
4.1.3 Game-theoretical models, with or without rationality
The basic idea of the game-theoretical models relevant for us is this. Retaining the
assumption of rationality but changing the situation (constraints) in which the
individuals interact. Here, instead of an impersonal market implicit in usual EAL
models of law enforcement (Becker 1976, for a succint version of the traditional EAL
view see Polinsky and Shavell, 2000) strategic interaction (game-theoretical situation) is
used (Holler 1993, Frey and Holler 1999). Regarding the problem of law enforcement in
the practical, legal policy sense (EAL3), this approach also provides policy
recommendations, which are, on occasion more promising than the traditional ones or at
least prove why the traditional approach is unsatisficing in many respects.
This game theoretical approach can be modified further by the adoption of
evolutionary models. Here also we find a multiplicity of approaches and models with at
least one thing in common. The problem of rationality comes back in another way.
Evolutionary game theory as a supra-individual explanation is sometimes welcomed for
explicitly rejecting the assumptions about individual (hyper-)rationality and focusing on
learning, imitation and other replicator mechanisms (Skyrms 1996, Young 1998, cf.
Platteau, 2000: ch. 1 and 8). There are, however rather convincing arguments that
evolutionary models cannot “provide a basis for doing without rationality” (Bunzl
2002). In this perspective the so called indirect evolutionary approach may be
interesting (see, e. g. Güth and Napel, 2003: 1–3). The basic idea of the indirect
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evolutionary approach is the following. In contrast to other evolutionary models, here
the rationality of the players is assumed, what is evolving is the constraints within
which they are placed.
Harsanyi claimed that all that is explained in terms of social norms could be
explained through use of the conceptual machinery of game theory.  Ullmann-Margalit
disagrees (1977: 14). Even if adopting game theory in the analysis of norms, she claims
that “the framework of the theory of games as a formal discipline is too narrow, and
hence inadequate, for an account of the generation of norms” (Ullmann-Margalit 1977:
6), especially because of the multiple equilibria problem, where common cultural
background etc. help to find focal points. Thus connotations of games and the
contextual details matter (cf. section 2.4 above on social meaning). In order to transcend
the debate between Harsanyi and Ullmann-Margalit, the evolutionary approach may be
helpful. For example, Binmore (1994, 1998) explicitly deals with multiple equilibria
situations as a sort of co-ordination problem regarding equilibrium choice. Here we can
see the contrast between classical and evolutionary approaches in game theory – the
choice of focal points lies outside of the scope of the former but is an explanandum for
the latter.
4.1.4 Endogenous development of (conditional) morality
A further family of game theoretical models shares the idea of retaining the assumption
of instrumental rationality but in a rather sophisticated way. In contrast to (1) changes in
external constraints (section 4.1.3), (2) reputation effects or (3) the introduction
preference for morality simply by an ad hoc assumption (see section 2.3), non-
opportunistic behaviour is explicated in these models by self-management,
“egonomics”, i. e. through an endogeneous process of preference modification by
rational individuals (see, e. g. Frank 1987, 1988, Schelling 1978). For example, Raub
and Voss present a mechanism where moral preferences (more precisely, those
representing an Assurance Game) emerge as the outcome of rational individual choices.
Applying standard game theory to the decision on “effective preferences” they model an
endogenous development of (conditional) morality by self-interested individuals (Raub
and Voss, 1990: 86).
4.2 Progress through distinctions
To profit from these diverse models in enriching EAL’s answer to the problem of the
normativity of law, we have to make certain distinctions. In dealing with this problem
we are directly interested
(1) in norms in general and especially in legal norms but not in the interaction of legal
and non-legal (“social”) norms as such or the sustainability of co-operation in general or
in economic situations (these can be highly relevant for empirically oriented research,
but are irrelevant for the analytical or conceptual question of the nature of law),
(2) in the consequences of law being institutional and systemic,
(3) in the motives or reasons of individuals for compliance and not in the emergence of
norms.
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I shall explain these distinctions in sections 4.2.1–4.2.3, respectively. Finally, in section
4.3 I shall distinguish different types of situations that law regulates. Arguably, these
different “functions of law” can be linked to (modelled as) different types of games
while each function has potentially a corresponding type of norm which, in turn
generates different motives and reasons for rule-following.
4.2.1. Legal vs. social norms
In section 2.3 we have already mentioned the relatively recent but intense interest of
EAL scholars for the problem of ‘norms’, i.e. social (non-legal) norms, and their
interaction with law. Although these recent developments in EAL promise important
insights in understanding social norms (e.g. Cooter 1997, 1998, Symposium 1996, 1998,
Posner 2000), i.e. informal social control, these are, at first glance not directly relevant
for the understanding of the normativity of law.
If behaviour is in conformity with law because of compliance with a non-legal
norm, the normative force of law does not work in this case, even if legal obligations are
fulfilled and rights are respected. There are, however, several reasons not to neglect
these results.
These contributions are important even for jurisprudence inasmuch as they focus on
the interaction of several different normative systems. The central subject matter of
legal theory is to define the specificity of law but the functioning of a legal system
cannot be understood without due attention to the interaction of different norms. It is a
commonplace in the sociology of law that in order to be effective, legal duties have to
coincide with the requirements of social norms, in many contexts. Thus, even if this
does not question the importance of conceptual analysis and discussion on the sound
understanding of the concept of law and its normativity, sociological critiques of legal
centralism (Ellickson 1991, 1998, Posner, 2000: ch. 1) have repercussions on legal
theory in this narrow, conceptual sense too.
There is another, more formal reason for being attentive to rational choice models
of norms. If we want to explain when and why people obey the law qua law within a
rational choice model, we have to use analytical methods similar to models of norm-
following in non-legal contexts. This doesn’t rule out the importance of law’s
specificity, its institutionalised and systemic nature. What sort of difference these do
make is to be discussed in the next subsection.
In sum, knowledge about social norms is crucially important for EAL and legal
scholarship in general, both theoretically and practically. But it does not answer directly
and specifically the questions about the normativity of law.
4.2.2. Officials and citizens. The institutional and systemic character of law
When cursorily discussing the difference between legal and social norms, Elster makes
an interesting statement: “legal norms are enforced by specialists who do so out of self-
interest: they will lose their job if they don’t. By contrast, social norms are enforced by
members of the general community and not always out of self-interest.” (Elster 1989a:
100) This criterion of distinction is highly controversial (especially with regard to the
motives of the enforcers, see below) but it draws attention to an important feature of
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legal systems, at least in their modern form. Namely, to the institutional character of
law, that there is a specialised staff of people who enforce law.
Legal theorists tend to agree (see Hart 1994, Lagerspetz 1995, Postema 1982, Raz
1990) that there is a systematic difference between officials of a legal system and
members of the society subject to law (including officials acting in their non-official
capacities) with respect to their attitude toward law. This difference is not only
empirical but has some analytical consequences. Jurisprudence quite generally holds
Hart’s view (with slight differences) that as a conceptual minimum, for the existence of
a legal system it is necessary that the officials, especially the judges take an internal
perspective on law. Thus it is logically possible to speak about an existing legal system
(though not an efficacious or a flourishing one) even in case when none of the citizens
take the internal perspective but most of them simply obey by adopting the external
perspective (the bad man’s view).
In this respect, standard EAL as presented in section 2.2 is compatible with
mainstream positivist legal theory, especially that of Hart who sees the internal
perspective of officials and the conformity of citizens as a conceptual minimum of a
working legal system (Kornhauser 2001).
This compatibility becomes, however less straightforward if we look at a more
elaborate view on the existence conditions of a legal system (Lagerspetz 1995: 167–
174). More specifically we will concentrate on one set of necessary conditions for the
existence of a legal system, efficacy. This may contain two different conditions for
these two groups of persons (officials and citizens). For both groups we can distinguish
four possible basic attitudes, in an increasing strength order: conformity, obedience,
acceptance, moral acceptance. Thus there are the following possibilities (Lagerspetz
1995: 168):
(1) Officials conform to the rules of the system.
(2) Officials obey the rules of the system.
(3) Officials accept the rules of the system.
(4) Officials morally accept the rules of the system.
(1’) Citizens conform to the rules of the system.
(2’) Citizens obey the rules of the system.
(3’) Citizens accept the rules of the system.
(4’) Citizens morally accept the rules of the system.
In both series, the latter attitudes imply the former (obedience implies conformity,
acceptance implies both obedience and conformity, etc.). We can characterise different
legal theories as which combination of criteria they accept. E. g. (2) + (1’) can be
ascribed to Kelsen, while (2) + (2’) to Austin. Hart’s conceptual minimum requires (3)
+ (2’), thus no moral  acceptance is needed according to him. Most of the current
controversies in jurisprudence are about the replacement or otherwise of (3) by (4).
Without going into details, I note that (4) as a categorical requirement would rule out
the possibility of indifferent or critical officials (e.g. a philosophical anarchist judge). At
the same time, (3) is compatible with a situation where all officials pretend (4), while
believing that others adopt (4) and subscribe to the official claims of the legal system.
This situation may leave room for the difference between exciting (motivating) and
justifying reasons for judges, mentioned above (MacCormick 1987: 111–2). Thus, the
legal system may work in this way if the lack of moral acceptance is not common
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knowledge. However (3) + (2’) is, even in Hart’s view, only an extreme limiting case.
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Lagerspetz’s arguments seem plausible that (4) + (3’) is “a more appropriate description
of the efficacy of a modern [legal] system” (Lagerspetz 1995: 171), especially if with
regard to (3’) we speak only about the majority of citizens in the majority of the cases
and we interpret (4) in a relaxed way, probably only in a justifying reason sense. We
shall come back to the question of the citizens’ attitudes toward law in section 4.3.
4.2.3 Distinguishing emergence and compliance
Social norms and institutions raise at least two very general questions for social
scientists: (1) how and why norms come into being, (2) why people comply with norms.
In this paper we are mainly interested in the second question and we can thus rely on the
results of research in this direction.
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These problems are not independent, however. Namely the second question is
clearly related to such further problems as “how and when norms persist and change”
and in this way it is also linked to the first question about the emergence. The link may
be more direct if we try to explain norms and institutions as part of a spontaneous order,
i. e. as unintended consequences of individual actions (see Barry 1982).
For the present purposes, it is interesting to see that the answer to (2) depends on
how we explain (1). One such link is obviously the problem of legitimacy. Even from an
observer perspective it is clear that if people ask (2) normatively: ‘Are there good
reasons to follow these rules?’ the answer depends, at least in part on what they think
about the origin and thus the authority of the rules: voluntary agreement, dictate,
customary rule, etc.
The answer to (2) is arguably correlated to the answer to (1) also because there are
different types of situations that tend to call for different types of norms. These norms,
in turn, offer different reasons to follow them. These interrelated differences in
situations, norms and reasons are clearly relevant for the problem of normativity, as
well. We shall elaborate on this important topic in the next section.
4.3 Which game do we play?
Edna Ullmann-Margalit, in her famous book The Emergence of Norms (1977) gives an
account of three types of strategic interaction situations where norms are susceptible to
emerge. She assumes that every strategic situation can be classified as a combination of
the three core or paradigmatic cases: (1) Prisoners’ Dilemma situations, (2) co-
ordination problems, (3) inequality/partiality situations. Even if this trichotomy is
disputable, we follow her in viewing these situations useful in classifying norms. With
due caution, we can do it also by speaking about the different functions of law. The
                                                
14 Hart famously notes (1994: 114) about such a situation: “The society in which this was so might be
deplorably sheeplike; the sheep may end in the slaughterhouse. But there is little reason for thinking that
it could not exist or for denying it the title of a legal system.“
15 Some philosophers argue that rational choice theory cannot really explain the origin of rules. Rules of a
game are always exogeneous to the explanation because it has to rely on some previous rules and
preference structure which are (considered) given (Kliemt, 1990: 73, 78–79). This might be true in a
strictly logical sense, but as I see it doesn‘t rule out the possibility to construct medium-level theories
with some exogeneous variables.
17 Cserne: The Normativity of Law in Law and Economics
Produced by bepress.com, 201118
basic idea is that different functions (a) correspond to different game theoretic models,
(b) provide different reasons for compliance, and thus (c) may explain normativity in
different ways.
4.3.1 Interrelated differences in situations, norms and reasons
There are several important functions which the law serves in our society (“solving
recurrent and multiple coordination problems, setting standards for desirable behavior,
proclaiming symbolic expressions of communal values, resolving disputes about facts”,
Marmor 2001), probably without being one essential among them. For example in
private law, especially contractual problems usually correspond to 2-person games,
often repeated ones.
16 Public law is usually concerned with large-scale (n-person)
collective action problems, which are one-shot in a game theoretical sense (i. e. due to
anonymity without reputation effects, see Andreozzi 2002: 407–8). But in the
enforcement, these problems are arguably to be modelled as 2-person games (Holler
1993, Frey and Holler 1999, Andreozzi 2002). Interestingly, in some situations law is
supposed to impede co-operation and maintain Prisoners’ Dilemmas, e. g. for cartels
and certain types of corruption. Thus the uncritical identification of co-operative
strategy in PD situations with moral behaviour is false. There are laws (antitrust rules)
which aim to keep people in PD situations. From a legal policy (EAL3) perspective this
means that in order to justify a legal change it is not sufficient to demonstrate that there
is a PD situation, there has to be a reason to consider it “inappropriate”, i.e. a problem
waiting for legal solution.
To sum up, the different situations that law regulates can be modelled by different
games and each has potentially a corresponding type of norm and a different typical
reason or motivation for following the law. More importatly, if there is no single or
essential reason to follow the rules of law, there cannot be a single explanation of its
normativity. Thus we have to distinguish and characterise different types of cases. One
useful typology (based on Ullmann-Margalit 1977 and Coleman 1990) is presented by
Esser (2000: 56, 129–131).
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16 For a brilliant indirect evolutionary model of law enforcement in a private law situation where courts
also sustain trustwortiness, see Güth and Ochsenfels 2000. Applying an indirect evolutionary approach
with endogenous preference formation, they show that a legal system can induce players to reward trust
even if material incentives dictate to exploit trust. The model assesses how a court influences the share of
kept promises of 'truly' trustworthy players who evolutionarily evolved as trustworthy and of
opportunistic players who are only trustworthy if inspired by material incentives.
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Adapted from Esser 2000: 130 (Fig. 5.5)
These three types of norm require an increasingly external guarantee and sanctions. The
separate and genuine problem of legitimacy rises only for repressive norms, the other
types of norms are legitimised by the interests the agents have in their validity. To be
noted, this structural typology doesn’t account for the emergence of norms in the strict
sense. This poses a separate, second-order problem.
What this table says about law seems to be, at first sight, in conflict with the discussions
above. But this contradiction can be solved, in part, if we keep in mind that the
specificity of law is captured here by its ability to resolve conflict situations through
repressive rules, which no other norm can do. Law is “the strongest weapon” among the
three but it may and often actually does regulate the two other types of problem as well,
which have different structures (Esser 2000: 56). In these cases there is a unilateral
substitutability and a potential conflict between law and the other solution mechanisms
(habit, morality) that the two first types of situation would minimally require. It should
be noted that the table only points to the problem of legitimacy, without solving it – this
applies consequently to the question of normativity of repressive law as well. But it
makes clear again that if we want to understand the specificity of law (the nature of
legal normativity), we have to concentrate on situations where what law requires does
not coincide with habits or morality, i.e. non-legal norms.
4.3.2 Law as convention, law as co-ordination
There are several legal theories that seek to understand legal normativity from law’s
conventional nature. In their attempt, they increasingly rely on rational choice theory, in
spite of the doubts about compatibility mentioned above. Thus, mainly influenced by
the works of the philosophers David Lewis (1969) and Edna Ullmann-Margalit (1977)
who in their turn relied on the results of Thomas Schelling (1960), legal theorists have
begun in the last decades to use basic game theoretical concepts and models.
17 They
seem to be especially concerned with co-ordination games and conventions in
discussing the nature and main functions of law, including the problem of its
normativity.
Still, there are at least three different senses in which this “law as co-ordination”
paradigm has been used. In an order of decreasing generality these can be characterised
briefly as follows:
1. Law (like paper money) is essentially conventional by its nature. The existence
of law as a social phenomenon depends on mutual beliefs and expectations of people, it
has no existence in a meaningful sense outside the mind of its subjects and officials.
Without this mutual belief, the existence of law is inconceivable (Lagerspetz 1995: ch.
1, Ruiter 1993).
2. Law offers the solution to co-ordination problems by pointing at one equilibrium
in the game. One of the most important functions of law is to determine (cf. the term
determinatio in Aquinas) one of several equally possible and just (not unjust)
arrangements of social affairs (Finnis 1989). In this way it may also offer a justification
of law’s authority (Gans 1983).
                                                
17 For an overview see Special Issue 1998, Postema 1998.
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3. Law is conceived as a complex system of strategic interactions that are
essentially of co-ordinating nature (Postema 1982). More precisely, according to
Postema there are three levels of co-ordination: among citizens (as in the point 2), but
also between officials and citizens, and further between officials. The second level is
especially important, because Postema attempts to ground the judges’ obligation to obey
the law in the conventional nature of the rule of recognition.
18
The question whether law solves co-ordination problems in a game theoretical
sense is partly a conceptual but partly an empirical question. For instance, it is highly
controversial that the co-ordinative function of law is compatible with its coerciveness,
let alone could justify or legitimise its use of coercion (Ullmann-Margalit 1983). If law
is generally viewed as a co-ordinating authority, it is questionable whether it can justify
coercion. As for co-ordination norms, there is an intrinsic reward in conformity to
norms. Fear of sanctions, not to speak about moral commitment, has only a secondary
rule beside self-interest.
The question is thus: if law is essentially founded on social conventions, how can
this conventional practice give rise to reasons for action and to obligations? I shall argue
that conventional rules cannot, by themselves, give rise to obligations.
19
As we have seen in point 2, according to some theorists, conventional rules emerge
as solutions to recurrent co-ordination problems. If the rules of recognition are of such a
co-ordination kind, it is relatively easy to explain how they may give rise to obligations.
Co-ordination conventions would be obligatory if the norm subjects have an obligation
to solve the co-ordination problem that initially gave rise to the emergence of the
relevant convention. This, however, may be true for co-ordination among officials, but
definitely not true for citizens. It is namely hard to imagine how to ground this further
obligation to solve the co-ordination problem.
But it is also questionable that co-ordination conventions are at the foundations of
law as regard to the rule of recognition. In certain respects the law may be more like a
structured game which is actually constituted by social conventions. Such constitutive
conventions are not explicable as solutions to some pre-existing recurrent co-ordination
problem, because the conventional rules constitute the game itself as a kind of social
activity. The constitutive conventions partly constitute the values inherent in the
emergent social practice. Such values, however, are only there for those who care to see
them. And the existence of a social practice, in itself, does not provide anyone with an
obligation to engage in the practice.
The rules of recognition only define what the practice is, and they can say nothing
on the question of whether one should or should not engage in it. But once one engages
in the practice, playing the judge, there are legal obligations defined by the rules of the
game. The rules of recognition cannot settle for the judge, or anyone else for that matter,
whether they should play by the rules of law, or not. They only tell the judges what the
law is. The obligation to play the role may be grounded in independent moral reasons.
And these reasons are most probably not the same as the reasons citizens have to obey
the law.
                                                
18 Following Hart, the rule of recognition is defined as social conventions which determine certain facts or
events that provide the ways for the creation, modification, and annulment of legal standards. These facts,
such as an act of legislation or a judicial decision, are the sources of law conventionally identified as such
in each and every modern legal system (Hart 1994: ch. 6.1).
19 Here again, I follow Marmor 2001. For the affirmative answer see Postema 1998, Special Issue 1998.
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4.3.3 Coercion and conditional cooperation
On the other side, if the rationale of a great variety of legal arrangements can be best
explained by the function of law in solving problems of opportunism and inefficiency
(Prisoner’s Dilemma situations) then the law’s main role is, indeed, one of providing
coercive measures. Still, even if law’s functions are more closely related to its coercive
aspect than Hart and Postema seem to have assumed (see section 3.3 above), we should
refrain from endorsing Austin’s or Kelsen’s position that providing sanctions is law’s
only function in society.
As we have seen above, law fulfills very different functions in a modern society
while Esser’s characterisation of law by its potentially repressive nature has still some
plausibility. Still it may be argued that if we have to single out one essential feature of
law, we should better see it as having another, less dismal nature than repression, even
if speaking about law in very general terms. It is often argued that the basic problem of
social order (which Parsons called the Hobbesian Problem) can be modelled as a
Prisoners’ Dilemma. Now, PD norms turn these games into Assurance Games
(Ullmann-Margalit 1977: 35) which represent a conditionally co-operative attitude. If
we scrutinise Hobbes’ writings other than Leviathan, it turns out that, in contrast to the
usual interpretations Hobbes also agreed that the basic problem of how to sustain a
social order among rational self-interested individuals is captured best by something
like the Assurance Game (see Lagerspetz 1995, ch. 9). Thus, even if there is no single
“essential“ function for law, one of its most important functions is to serve as an
instrument for sustaining conditional co-operation.
5. Sociology vs. Philosophy: Conclusions
Starting from the existing endeavours in EAL, I have summarised the impact of rational
choice methods on legal theory in explaining the nature of law, and discussed the
possible changes in EAL as a result from learning lessons both from recent game
theoretical results and from legal theory as practical philosophy. There are still several
questions left open.
Game theory and more generally, rational choice theory can be a useful tool both
for sociology and philosophy. There are still questions that are inaccessible for or
simply outside the scope of empirical sciences. The normativity of law, as a
characteristic of human attitudes toward a system of rule and beliefs about the reasons
for following these rules is evidently not such a question. In contrast, the normativity of
law as part of a theory of adjudication is.
We can approve that Sen is right in saying that in a strictly logical sense when
analysing law in a social scientific manner, there should not be an a priori bias toward
(1) prudence against morality, (2) self-interest against altruism and (3) rationality
against structural constraints. His view that evolutionary and reflective mechanisms are
complementary is especially important  (see Sen 1998: xii-xiii).  But in my view (which
I share with Max Weber, Jon Elster, John Harsanyi and others) he goes too far when
concluding from the lack of logical priority that there is no methodological primacy
either. Probably this is what Elster meant when saying that the rational-actor theory is
prior to its competitors (norm-oriented and structuralist approaches), even though not
necessarily more successful in each particular case (Elster 1984: viii-ix). The main
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reasons for this are rather pragmatic: prudence, self-interest and rationality are simply
convenient to be privileged as initial assumptions about human behaviour.
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